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CURRENT ISSUES
WILL THE EMPIRE STATE STRIKE
BACK AT COMMERCIAL
POLLUTERS? A PROPOSAL FOR A
TRANSACTION-TRIGGERED
HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP
STATUTE IN NEW YORK
Over the past two decades, environmental policies have evolved
into one of the leading concerns of the nation.' Federal environ-
1 See Recent Developments: In the Congress, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10039 (Jan.
1990). Congressional awareness of environmental issues has been heightened; action must
follow:
Every year the number of environmental bills introduced into the Congress of the
United States increases. The United States and the world are becoming aware of the
politics of our environment and what the failure to act may mean. Serious attempts
have recently been made to change our policy from being reactive as the political
need arises, to being proactive in order to project our existence into the long term
future. The first session of the 101st Congress was part reactive and part proactive.
The second session of the 101st Congress will help set the environmental tone for
the 1990s and beyond.
Id. at 10041. See generally Reitz, Environmental Policy - It Is Time For A New Beginning, 14
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 111, 120-21 (1989) (advocates comprehensive environmental policy);
Current Developments, Mitchell Calls Bush's Clean Air Bill Weak, Says Potential Gains Offset
By Backward Steps, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 590, 590-91 (July 1989) (criticizes President's
Clean Air Act); Dowd, Who's Environment Czar, EPA's Chief or Sununu, N.Y. Times, Feb.
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mental regulation expanded in the early 1970's with the establish-
ment of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)' and the
promulgation of several environmental statutes.' Although these
were progressive attempts to ameliorate environmental deteriora-
tion, a major criticism of federal environmental legislation was,
15, 1990, at Al, col. 1 ("As the nation's defense recedes as an overriding issue . . . the
environment becomes a more important one for Republican[s]."); N.Y. Times, Jan. 15,
1990, at A13, col. 1 (failure to clean up waste sites embarrassment to EPA); Sancton, What
On Earth Are We Doing, TIME, Jan. 2, 1989, at 26 (foreboding of worldwide environmental
disasters prompted designation of endangered Earth as "Planet of the Year" for 1988).
"Taking effective action to halt the massive injury to the earth's environment will require a
mobilization of political will, international cooperation and sacrifice unknown except in
wartime. Yet humanity is in a war right now, and it is not too Draconian to call it a war for
survival." Id. at 30. See Magnuson, A Problem That Cannot Be Buried: The Poisoning of America
Continues, TIME, Oct. 14, 1985, at 76, 77-78 (increased awareness of health risks posed by
chemical contamination has led to demand for more effective governmental action).
I See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970), reprinted in, 42
U.S.C.A. § 4321 (West 1983). President Nixon ordered the establishment of an Environ-
mental Protection Agency to consolidate federal environmentally related activities. Id. He
stated in the message accompanying the reorganization order that:
Our national government today is not structured to make a coordinated attack on
the pollutants which debase the air we breathe, the water we drink, and the land
that grows our food. Indeed, the present governmental structure for dealing with
environmental pollution often defies effective and concerted action.
This consolidation of pollution control authorities would help assure that we do not
create new environmental problems in the process of controlling existing ones.
Because environmental protection cuts across so many jurisdictions, and because
arresting environmental deterioration is of great importance to the quality of life in
our country and the world ... a strong, independent agency is needed.
Id. See also Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254, 257 (1st Cir. 1972) (purpose of Act is to con-
sider environmental consequences at earliest stage); Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'n v. United
States Postal Serv., 389 F. Supp. 1171, 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (purpose of Act is to consider
and examine consequences before effects are irreversible). See generally Reitz, supra note 1,
at 115 (evolution of federal environmental programs discussed); Commoner, Failure of the
Environmental Effort, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10195, 10195-99 (June 1988) (dis-
cussion of original goals of EPA and of failure in having not yet met them); Shabecoff,
House Votes Bill to Elevate EPA to Cabinet Position, N.Y. Times, March 29, 1990, at A 1, col. 1
(American public's concern for environment results in most Representatives voting to ele-
vate EPA to cabinet position despite massive reorganization problems).
' See infra notes 16-25 and accompanying text (discussion of CERCLA); infra notes 8-14
and accompanying text (discussion of RCRA); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42
U.S.C. § 7401 (1982 & Supp. V 1983) (protects and enhances "quality of nation's air"
through pollution control programs); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601
(1982 & Supp. V 1983) (regulation of chemical substances and those who manufacture
chemical substances that pose risk of injury to health or environment); Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982 & Supp. V 1983) (Con-
gressional goal is to "restore and maintain chemical physical and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters").
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and continues to be, its failure to effectively place liability on re-
sponsible parties.' Consequently, some states have focused their
hazardous waste legislation on real estate transactions in an at-
tempt to better address environmental cleanup liability. 5 The
most prominent and controversial example of this emphasis on
real estate transactions is the transaction-triggered cleanup
statute.'
New York has yet to enact aggressive real estate transfer-trig-
gered hazardous waste legislation, although several proposals have
been submitted to the legislature." The purpose of this Note is to
propose a practical statute for New York. First, this Note will cri-
tique federal environmental statutes mandating the cleanup of
' See Wagner, Liability for Hazardous Waste Cleanup: An Examination of New Jersey's Ap-
proach, 13 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 245, 248-49 (1989).
Our justice system is based on the notion that guilty parties should be prosecuted
and deterred, while innocent parties should be protected and compensated. Overlay-
ing this notion on CERCLA leads to frustration and discomfort with the underlying
language. The legislation, even following the passage of SARA, places the burden
for investigating sources of contamination on an innocent purchaser, and in some
cases still holds these innocent owners of contaminated land financially responsible
for prior landowners' wrongs.
Id. See also Bush, George Bush on the Environment, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10293,
10294 (Aug. 1988) (as presidential candidate, he promised to enforce environmental laws
by "putting the responsibility for cleanup where it belongs, on those who caused the prob-
lem in the first place"); Note, Liabilities of the Innocent Current Owner of Toxic Property Under
CERCLA, 23 U. Riai. L. REv. 403, 408 (1989) (liability based on ownership can be unfair to
parties who unwittingly find themselves responsible for enormous cleanup costs).
* See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25359.7 (Deering Supp. 1990) (Hazardous Sub-
stance Account Act) (notification requirements in nonresidential property transfer); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 22a-134 (1990) (Transfer Act) (safety and notification regulations for property
transfers); HAW. REv. STAT. § 343D (1985) (Environmental Disclosure Law) (full disclosure
necessary for purchase of more than 5% of corporate assets); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30 para.
901-02 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (Responsible Property Transfer Act of 1988) (notice to
purchaser of past use and status); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-22.5 (Burns Supp. 1990) (Respon-
sible Property Transfer Law) (30 day disclosure before transfer - penalty imposed for fail-
ure); IowA CODE ANN. § 455B.430 (West Supp. 1990) (Environmental Quality Act) (full
disclosure and subject to director approval before transfer); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B. 16
(West 1987) (Environmental Response and Liability Act) (no use of land after closure of
disposal facility); Mo. ANN. STAT § 260.465 (Vernon 1990) (Solid Waste Law) (notification
required prior to transfer of site); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-6-14 (West Supp. 1990) (Envi-
ronmental Cleanup Responsibility Act) (inspection required at closing or sale).
' See infra notes 65-84 and accompanying text (discussion of transaction-triggered notifi-
cation statutes).
See infra notes 85-102 and accompanying text (discussion of New York's proposals to
date). See generally Privitera, Where's POPA? It is Time to Enact New York's Property Owners
Protection Act, N.Y. ST. B.J. (July 1990) 33, 34 ("[fi]n order to protect new buyers of commer-
cial property and to further the State's efforts toward the cleanup of toxic dumps within its
borders, the Legislature is urged to pass the bill this term") (hereinafter Where's POPA?].
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real property. Second, this Note will compare state statutes impos-
ing various remediation requirements triggered by transfers of
real property. Finally, this Note will recommend an ideal transfer-
triggered cleanup statute for the state of New York.
I. FEDERAL REGULATIONS
A. Resource Conservation & Recovery Act of 1976
In 1965 Congress enacted the Solid Waste Disposal Act,' which
was later amended by the Resource Conservation & Recovery Act
of 1976 (RCRA).9 The purpose of RCRA was to establish a "cra-
dle to grave" tracking system that regulated the generation, han-
dling and disposal of hazardous waste."0 Although RCRA is regu-
latory in nature, section 700311 imposes liability for cleanup on
the landowner if the EPA determines that the hazardous condi-
tion is an "imminent and substantial endangerment." 2 Another
' Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1982 & Supp. V 1983).
' Resource Conservation & Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1982 & Supp. V
1987) [hereinafter RCRA].
10 See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1070 (D. Colo. 1985) ("RCRA
provides for the promulgation of regulations by the Environmental Protection Agency ap-
plicable to generators of hazardous waste, transporters of hazardous waste and owners and
operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities"); H.R. REP. No. 96-
1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120
(RCRA is "prospective cradle-to-grave regulatory regime" for hazardous waste); Anderson,
Will the Meek Even Want the Earth?, 38 MERcER L. REv. 535, 552 (1987) (RCRA imposes
strict requirements which are principally prospective in nature).
" See RCRA § 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) which provides in
pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, upon receipt of evidence that
the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any
solid waste or hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to health or the environment, the Administrator may bring suit on behalf of
the United States in the appropriate district court against any person .. .who has
contributed or who is contributing to such handling, storage, treatment, transporta-
tion, or disposal ... to order such person to take such other action as may be neces-
sary ....
Id. See also United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (D. Conn.
1980) (Act focuses on prevention of danger to health and environment).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1073 (D.N.J. 1981) (RCRA applied
to successor landowner who did not investigate landfill which was substantial endanger-
ment), affd, 688 F.2d 204 (3rd Cir. 1982); United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F.
Supp. 870, 885 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (even minute leakage of hazardous substance is imminent
and substantial danger to health and environment). See also Bleicher & Stonelake, Caveat
Emptor: The Impact of Superfund and Related Laws on Real Estate Transactions, 14 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10017, 10019 (Jan. 1984) ("government relies most heavily on the
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provision of RCRA, section 3013(a), allows the EPA to compel
past or present owners of the site to analyze, monitor, and test the
site and report these findings to the Agency.13
B. Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liabil-
ity Act of 1980
In response to both RCRA's inability to effectively handle active
hazardous sites"' and the public concern generated by the envi-
ronmental catastrophe at Love Canal,"' Congress, in 1980, en-
imminent hazard provision of RCRA . . . to hold landowners liable for hazardous waste
pollution").
18 RCRA § 3013(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6934(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1983). Section 3013(a) pro-
vides in pertinent part:
If the Administrator determines, upon receipt of any information, that (1) the pres-
ence of any hazardous waste at a facility or site at which hazardous waste is, or has
been, stored, treated, or disposed of, or (2) the release of any such waste from such
facility or site may present a substantial hazard to human health or the environment,
he may issue an order requiring the owner or operator of such facility or site to
conduct such monitoring, testing, analysis, and reporting with respect to such facility
or site as the Administrator deems reasonable to ascertain the nature and extent of
such hazard.
Id. See also United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 1984) (RCRA
applied to past hazardous site since leaking is construed-to be "occurrence included in the
meaning of disposal in the statute").
"' See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1252 (S.D. 11. 1984)
("CERCLA was enacted because Congress realized there were serious gaps in RCRA");
H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6119, 6120 (while previous legislation was regulatory, CERCLA will impose strict
liability; its purpose is to pursue appropriate response to inactive hazardous sites); Levitas &
Hughes, Hazardous Waste Issues in Real Estate Transactions, 38 MERGER L. REV. 581, 591
(1987) (fundamental purpose of RCRA is regulation of sites while fundamental purpose of
CERCLA is cleanup of sites; Congress intended their effect to be cumulative); Comment,
Hidden Hazards of Hazardous Waste Cleanup Laws: Lenders and Title Insurers Beware, 18
CUMB. L. REV. 723, 725 (1988) (Congress passed CERCLA when it recognized that RCRA
did not cover abandoned sites).
15 See M. BROWN, LAYING WASTE: THE POISONING OF AMERICA By Toxic CHEMICALS, at
289-301 (1979) (discussion of inadequacy of EPA in addressing problem of toxic waste in
wake of Love Canal). During the 1940's, Hooker Chemicals Corporation, a manufacturer
of pesticides, plasticizers and caustic sodas, dumped 20,000 tons of waste into the canal. Id.
at 5. In 1953, Hooker deeded the property to the Niagara Board of Education for one
dollar: "At that time the company issued no detailed warnings about the chemicals; a brief
paragraph in the quitclaim document disclaimed company liability for any injuries or
deaths that might occur at the site." Id. at 8. A school and playground were ultimately
constructed on the site. Id. at 10. In 1978, levels of contamination were so high that the
area was deemed a "great and imminent peril to the health of the general public." Id. at
27. See also Current Developments, Carter Orders Temporary Relocation of 710 Families from
Love Canal Area, 11 Env't Rep. (BNA) 139, 140 (May 1980) (Love Canal only hazardous
waste site to be declared national emergency). Regarding liability, Hooker maintained:
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acted the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
And Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund), as amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA). 6
CERCLA broadly defines the class of persons to be held strictly
liable for remediation costs.' 7 Only after cleanup is complete can
it 'does not own and has not owned the Love Canal site for 27 years.' The company
said in 1953, after it sold the site to the Niagara Falls School Board, it lost control. It
said although it warned the school board of the chemicals buried on the site, the
board and the City of Niagara Falls disturbed the clay over the site causing the
chemicals to leak into adjacent properties.
Id. at 140.
The Love Canal incident emphasized the need for more federally sponsored environ-
mental protection. See Current Developments, Extra Funds Sought for Love Canal; EPA Op-
poses Consulting Service Cut, 11 Env't Rep. (BNA) 948, 948 (Oct. 1980) (President Carter
asks Congress for $3.86 million to aid in Love Canal disaster). See also United States v.
Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 556 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (recent Love
Canal victims challenge CERCLA's innocent landowner defense); Glass, The Modern Snake
in the Grass: An Examination of Real Estate and Commercial Liability Under Superfund & SARA
and Suggested Guidelinesfor the Practitioner, 14 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. R.v. 381, 381-86 (1987)
(discussion of Love Canal's prompting of CERCLA).
16 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 9601 (1982 & Supp. V 1983) [hereinafter CERCLA]. See Note, supra note 4, at
403 (CERCLA enacted by Congress after many last minute compromises); Comment, Pri-
vate Response-Cost Recovery Actions Under CERCLA, 34 U. KAN. L. Rav. 109, 110 (1985) (CER-
CLA is Congress' attempt to fill gaps left from previous enactment of RCRA).
" See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1983). Persons responsible
for cleanup under CERCLA include:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel . . . or a facility, (2) any person who at the
time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which
such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who . . . arranged for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances . . . (4) any person who . .'. accepted
any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment ....
Id.
Courts have broadly defined "persons" liable under CERCLA. See, e.g., United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1988) (absentee "site-owners" held liable), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc.,
849 F.2d 1568, 1571 (5th Cir. 1988) (real estate developer held liable); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986) (share-
holder/corporate officer held liable), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v.
Price, 688 F.2d 204, 208-10 (3d Cir. 1982) (successor landowner held liable); Colorado v.
Idarado Mining Co., 707 F. Supp. 1227, 1230 (D. Colo. 1987) (subsidiary company held
liable for parent company contamination); Sunnen Prod. Co. v. Chemtech Indus., Inc,, 658
F. Supp. 276, 277-78 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (present owner held liable although chemicals
matched those handled and stored by previous owner); United States v. Maryland Bank &
Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579-80 (D. Md. 1986) (lender of foreclosed "facility" held
liable); United States v. Carolawn Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124, 2128 (D.S.C. 1984)
(company having title for one hour held liable); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp.,
546 F. Supp. 1100, 1105 (D. Minn. 1982) (successor landowners held jointly liable).
The statute does not expressly state that persons will be held strictly liable, but courts
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individuals attempt to recoup their costs from other potential par-
ties, known under the statute as potentially responsible persons
(PRPs).18 Defenses to the cleanup requirements of CERCLA are
limited to acts of God, acts of war and acts or omissions of con-
tractually unrelated third parties.1 9 CERCLA and RCRA cleanup
have held as such. See CERCLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1982 & Supp. V 1983) (" 'lia-
bility' under this subchapter shall be construed to be the standard of liability which obtains
under section 1321 of title 33 [Federal Water Pollution Control Act]"). See also New York
v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (legislative intent supports strict
liability standard); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio
1983) (same).
18 CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1982 & Supp. V 1983) provides, in relevant
part, that persons covered under the Act "shall be liable for - (A) all costs of removal or
remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian Tribe
not inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan; (B) any other necessary costs of re-
sponse incurred by any other person consistent with the National Contingency Plan ..
Id.
The extent of liability for the cleanup costs to a landowner remains unclear because the
statute does not explicitly define necessary "costs of response." See Jones v. Inmont Corp.,
584 F. Supp. 1425, 1429 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (" 'response costs' is nowhere defined in the
Act"). To prove damages, plaintiff must prove (1) the damages are "necessary costs of
response" and (2) the costs incurred are "consistent with the National Contingency Plan
(NCP)." Id.
Some courts use the EPA's National Priority List (NPL) as a litmus test in deciding
whether a cost is recoverable. Compare Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,
589 F. Supp. 1437, 1453-54 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (listing on NPL necessary to be consistent
with NCP) with New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1046 (2d Cir. 1985)
(listing on NPL not required to be consistent with NCP).
Other courts have held that "costs of response" are recoverable simply if they are consis-
tent with the broad goals of the NCP, making prior government approval of the cleanup
plan unnecessary. See, e.g., Cadillac Fairview/Cal. Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691,
694-95 (9th Cir. 1988) (costs of response recoverable prior to specific government ap-
proval); International Clinical Lab v. Stevens, 710 F. Supp. 466, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
(court affirmatively disavows requirement of prior governmental approval). See generally
Gaba, Recovering Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs: The Private Cause of Action Under CERCLA,
13 EcOLOGY L.Q. 181, 183 (1986) (EPA publishes NCP which identifies requirements for
proper cleanup; however, doubts still remain regarding future of cleanup efforts).
The type of costs recoverable under CERCLA have varied. See, e.g., Artesian Water Co.
v. Government of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 651 (3d Cir. 1988) (recovery costs of
future monitoring of hazardous substance recoverable when caused by release or threat of
release from site); Wickland Oil Terminals v. ASARCO, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir.
1986) (same); Pennsylvania Urban Dev. Corp. v. Golen, 708 F. Supp. 669, 671 (E.D. Pa.
1989) (investigation costs recoverable); Coburn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 19 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20256, 20257 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (costs of future monitoring of medical condi-
tion and water quality recoverable to residential property owner). But see, e.g., Sterling v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1212 (6th Cir. 1988) (property loss not recoverable);
Shore Realty Inc., 759 F.2d at 1049 (injunctive relief not available); Lykins v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21498, 21500 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (relocation
costs not recoverable), reconsid. denied, 710 F. Supp 1122 (E.D. Ky 1988); Wehner v.
Syntex Corp., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20469, 20470 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (same).
I' CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1983 & Supp. 1989). See Wagner Seed Co. v.
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costs potentially impact all transactions involving real property.20
As can be expected, their effect on real estate transactions is gen-
erally manifested in a reduced sales price of contaminated prop-
erty.2' As a result of this adverse effect on real property, indemni-
fication clauses in sales contracts are becoming more prevalent.2"
In addition, the threat of cleanup costs has prompted buyers to
conduct extensive investigations of property conditions prior to
purchase.2"
These factors indicate that CERCLA and RCRA have caused a
heightened awareness among buyers and sellers of the possibility
that hazardous substances may exist on their property. " Never-
theless, despite the gains these statutes have made toward cleaning
up hazardous sites and promoting awareness within the real estate
community, CERCLA and RCRA fall short in one critical respect:
they do not necessarily place the burden of cleanup on the actual
polluter.25 Even in instances in which the actual polluter is forced
Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 1986) (attempted use of act of God defense when fire
led to toxic spill; no review on merits); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053,
1061 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (heavy rains not act of God). See generally Note, supra note 4, at 407
(discusses difficulty in proving "contractually unrelated" for statutory defense).
*0 See Comment, The Environmental Due Diligence Defense and Contractual Protection De-
vices, 49 LA. L. REV. 1405, 1417 (1989) (any purchaser of immovable property must be
prepared to have third party defense available because he is current owner and liable
under CERCLA); Note, Landowner Liability Under CERCLA: Is Innocence a Defense?, 4 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENTARY 149, 179 (1988) (real estate transactions affected by CER-
CLA and potentially extensive cleanup costs).
1 See Gaba, supra note 18, at 219 (relevant issue under § 107(a)(4)(B) action is price of
land; market will adjust price accordingly); Glass, supra note 15, at 438 (reduced purchase
price evidences buyer's acknowledgment of hazard).
" See, e.g., Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1462 (9th Cir. 1986)
(indemnification clause in purchase agreement effects warranty of property but does not
effect CERCLA section 107 claims). See also Gaba, supra note 18, at 219 (prospective buyer
will protect himself by including indemnification for future cleanup in his contract for sale
of real estate); Glass, supra note 15, at 441 (indemnification clause has no effect on govern-
ment's ability to sue seller, or on buyer's use of CERCLA defense).
"* See Levitas & Hughes, supra note 14, at 583 (risk of liability for cleanup encourages a
careful examination of environmental conditions prior to purchase).
See generally Hayes & Dinkins, Environmental Liability in Real Property Transactions, 23
U. RiCH. L. REv. 349, 349 (1989) ("Federal and state environmental statutes now create
potential liability for parties to a variety of seemingly innocent transactions."); Zimmer-
man, Environmental Issues in Sales Transactions: The Seller's Perspective, 3 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENv'T 7, 8 (1988) (current environmental statutes and future laws must be contemplated in
real estate transaction).
,' See supra note 4 and accompanying text (CERCLA places liability on current owner,
who must then recover his losses from actual polluter in common law contribution cause of
action).
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to remediate the site, expedient cleanup cannot be ensured be-
cause bureaucratic delays are the inevitable result of government
agency supervision of remediation measures. Alternatively, it is
suggested that an individual state transaction-triggered cleanup
statute is a more effective means of ensuring the proper allocation
of cleanup responsibility. State statutes that place the responsibil-
ity for compliance on prospective buyers and sellers and that are
triggered by a transfer of or transaction in real property are likely
to be a more efficient means of regulating the cleanup of commer-
cial property. 6
II. STATE REGULATION
A. Conditional Cleanup Statutes
The generic term "conditional cleanup statute" can be used to
describe certain statutes that prohibit a seller from transferring
property that is not "clean. '2 7 Under these statutes, unless the
state certifies that the property is free of hazardous substances or
that adequate measures will be taken to remove such substances,
the property may not be transferred.
1. New Jersey
New Jersey was the first state to enact an aggressive conditional
cleanup law, the Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act
(ECRA).2R This law requires the cleanup of certain commercial or
industrial properties as a precondition to closure of the business
or transfer of the property.29 ECRA applies to defined "industrial
"O See infra notes 65-84 and accompanying text (discussion of cleanup regulation in trans-
action-triggered notification statutes).
" See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134(5) (1990) (cleanup certification necessary from
state); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1 K-9b(2) (West Supp. 1990) (cleanup plan must be submitted to
state Department of Environmental Protection prior to transfer).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:lK-6-14 (West Supp. 1990).
" d. § 13:1K-I I(a) (West Supp. 1990). The New Jersey legislature justified its enact-
ment of ECRA by declaring:
[T]he generation, handling, storage and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes
pose an inherent danger of exposing the citizens, property and natural resources of
this State to substantial risk of harm or degradation; that the closing of operations
and the transfer of real property utilized for the generation, handling, storage and
disposal of hazardous substances and wastes should be conducted in a rational and
orderly way, so as to mitigate potential risks; and that it is necessary to impose a
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establishments" ' 0 and is triggered by the closing, termination, or
transfer of operations. 1 Once ECRA is triggered, the owner or
precondition on any closure or transfer of these operations by requiring the ade-
quate preparation and implementation of acceptable cleanup procedures therefor.
Id. See generally Superior Air Prod. Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., 216 NJ. Super. 46, 64, 522
A.2d 1025, 1035 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (ECRA part of statutory scheme with
respect to remediation of contaminated commercial properties).
So N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-9 (West Supp. 1990). An "industrial establishment" is defined
as: "[A]ny place of business engaged in operations which involve the generation, manufac-
ture, refining, transportation, treatment, storage, handling, or disposal of hazardous sub-
stances or wastes on-site, above or below ground .... Id. § 13: IK-8(f). The statute classi-
fies these establishments according to Standard Industrial Classification numbers
designated by the Office of Management & Budget in the Executive Office of the President
of the United States. Id.
81 Id. § 13:1 K-9(a),(b) (West Supp. 1990). Events that trigger ECRA include: cessation of
all operations which involve hazardous waste; any transaction whereby an industrial estab-
lishment becomes nonoperational for health or safety reasons; and any transaction whereby
an industrial establishment undergoes changes in ownership. Id. § 13:1 K-8(b). See, e.g., In re
Fabritex Mills, Inc., 231 N.J. Super. 224, 231, 555 A.2d 649, 653 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1989) (cessation of operation interpreted to mean ceasing substantially all operations).
The statute defines transfer of ownership as "including but not limited to a sale of stock
in the form of statutory merger or consolidation, sale of the controlling share of the assets,
the conveyance of the real property, dissolution of corporate identity, financial reorganiza-
tion and the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-8(b) (West
Supp. 1990).
The statute was designed to cover a wide range of triggering events. See, e.g., New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. J.T. Baker Co., 234 N.J. Super. 234, 238, 560 A.2d 739, 740-
41 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1989) (potential merger would trigger ECRA); In re Robert L.
Mitchell Technical Center, 223 N.J. Super. 166, 173, 538 A.2d 410, 412 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div.) (if basis of company's activity is hazardous waste, merger of small research divi-
sion triggers ECRA), cert. denied, 111 N.J. 605, 546 A.2d 526 (1988); In re Vulcan Materi-
als Co., 225 N.J. Super. 212, 220, 542 A.2d 25, 28-29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988)
(closure of prior owner's landfill triggers ECRA). See also Farer, Transaction Triggered
ECRA: The New Wave in Cleanup Law, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 27, 1989 at 24 (transaction need not
occur in New Jersey to trigger ECRA).
Arguably, the applicability of ECRA in the bankruptcy context is conditioned upon the
actual sale of property. See In re Borne Chem. Co. Inc., 54 Bankr. 126 (D.N.J. 1984). In
Borne, Borne Chemical Company (Borne), in the process of liquidation and reorganization
sought approval of the proposed sale of two parcels of real estate. Id. at 128. New Jersey's
DEP objected to the proposal and threatened to void the transaction unless ECRA require-
ments were satisfied. Id. Borne petitioned the court for an order declaring, inter alia, that it
could close its agreement without complying with ECRA and that the DEP could not void
the sale. Id. The court rejected Borne's argument that ECRA was preempted by the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Id. at 130. The Bankruptcy Code does not state explicitly that it supercedes
all state law, nor is it so comprehensive that it entirely displaces state regulations. Id. Fur-
thermore, the court reasoned that the purposes of ECRA and of the Bankruptcy Code are
"not even remotely related." Id. at 131. Despite the costs that ECRA compliance would
impose upon Borne, and which would diminish funds available for distribution to creditors,
the court refused to conclude that ECRA conflicted with the Code. Id. at 131-32. Notwith-
standing this determination, the court, on reconsideration, allowed Borne to abandon one
parcel in compliance with ECRA and to cease operations on the other without complying
with ECRA. Id. at 134-35.
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operator must submit to the New Jersey Department of Environ-
mental Protection (NJDEP) either a negative declaration, 2 which
warrants that there are no hazardous substances on the site, or a
proposed cleanup plan with financial security guaranteeing its im-
plementation. 3 The NJDEP must approve the negative declara-
tion or the proposed cleanup plan3' and ultimately must certify
that the premises have been detoxified. a
The penalties for failing to comply with ECRA are severe. If
the statute is violated, the sale or transfer may be voided by the
transferee, and the owner or operator of the property may be
deemed strictly liable for cleanup costs and subjected to a $25,000
per day civil penalty. 7
However, the lower court case upon which the court based its decision was subsequently
overruled. See In re Quanta Resources Corp., 55 Bankr. 696 (D.N.J. 1983), rev'd, 739 F.2d
927 (3d Cir. 1984), affd sub nom. Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl.
Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986) (Supreme Court held that trustee in bankruptcy
could not abandon property in contravention of state statute or regulation reasonably
designed to protect public health or safety). See also Note, The Environmental Cleanup Re-
sponsibility Act (ECRA): New Accountability for Industrial Landowners in New Jersey, 8 SETON
HAU. LEG. J. 331, 349-358 (1985) (ECRA designed to protect public health, therefore,
Borne abandonment should not be tolerated).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-8(g) (West Supp. 1990). A "negative declaration" is a "written
declaration, submitted by an industrial establishment and approved by the [NJDEP], that
there has been no discharge of hazardous wastes on the site, or that any such discharge has
been cleaned up in accordance with procedures approved by the department, and there
remain no hazardous substances or wastes at the site of the industrial establishment." Id. at
§ 13:1K-8(g). Note, however, that a prospective buyer has no standing to challenge a
NJDEP letter of ECRA nonapplicability. See In re 970 Realty Assoc., 234 N.J. Super. 348,
351, 560 A.2d 1259, 1260 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (court did not allow challange
to NJDEP's declaration letter by buyer); Chemos Corp. v. NJDEP, 237 N.J. Super. 359,
367, 568 A.2d 75, 79 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (per curiam) (revocation of negative
declaration by NJDEP did not prejudice plaintiff when necessary submissions by plaintiff
were missing).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-9 (West Supp. 1990). The financial security consists of a
"surety bond or other financial security for approval by the department guaranteeing per-
formance of the cleanup in an amount equal to the cost estimate for the cleanup plan." Id.
at § 1I5:K-9(b)(3).
" Id. at § 13:1K-10. The department must approve the negative declaration or "inform
the industrial establishment that a cleanup plan shall be submitted" within 45 days of sub-
mission. Id. at § 13:1K-10(b).
Id. at § 13:1K-10(c). According to the schedule contained in the approved cleanup
plan, the department shall "inspect the premises to determine conformance with the mini-
mum standards for soil, groundwater and surface water quality and shall certify that the
cleanup plan has been executed and that the site has been detoxified." Id.
See id. at § 13:1K-13 (liability of transferor).
"Id. See also Dixon Venture v. Crucible, 235 N.J. Super. 105, 111, 561 A.2d 663, 666
(N.J. Super. App. Div. 1989) (ECRA also allows transferee to sue transferor for damages
rather than void conveyance).
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ECRA-type statutes have been introduced in several other
states; however, attempts at enactment have been unsuccessful.3 8
Several theories have been advanced to explain the reluctance of
other states to adopt an ECRA-type statute. 9 First, some states
recognize that certain provisions of CERCLA overlap ECRA, and
view ECRA as potentially needless legislation. For example, ECRA
provides an innocent purchaser a defense to cleanup responsibility
that was not previously available before SARA; but now CER-
CLA, as amended by SARA, also allows this defense.40 Second,
some states have chosen not to follow New Jersey's lead because
of the understaffing problems that have hindered the implementa-
tion of ECRA"1 and have created a substantial backlog in process-
ing applications."2 Third, ECRA has been faulted for its vague ter-
minology, especially with regard to the types of transactions that
See Farer, Transaction-Triggered Environmental Laws and State Super Liens: Latest Devel-
opments on the New Wave, reprinted in The Impact of Environmental Law in Real Estate and
Other Commercial Transactions, ALI-ABA Course Study Materials, at 47-57 (Sept. 1989)
[hereinafter Latest Developments] (States proposing ECRA-type laws include California
(1985-86); Delaware (1988); Maryland (1986); Massachusetts (1987); Michigan (1989); New
Hampshire (1986); New York (1989); Pennsylvania (1985)).
" See Schmidt, New Jersey's Experience Implementing the Environmental Cleanup Responsibil-
ity Act, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 729, 739-752 (1986) (discussion of general problems of ECRA,
such as understaffing and SIC code applications); Comment, New Jersey's Environmental
Cleanup Responsibility Act: An Innovative Approach to Environmental Regulation, 90 DicK. L.
REV. 159, 186-195 (1985) (discussion of both correct and erroneous interpretations of
ECRA).
40 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussion of SARA's innocent owner
defenses).
41 See Olson, ECRA: New Jersey's Cleanup Statute, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10395,
10396 (1987). In addition to size, Olson stated that lack of experience among the staff has
also been problematic: "The constant change in staff and the varied levels of training that
staff members receive means that the extent and intensity of ECRA review varies consider-
ably among the various case managers .... This contributes to the almost consistent exas-
peration with which ECRA is viewed by the business community." Id. But see Miller, New
Jersey's Improved ECRA Implementation: The State Answers Its Critics, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10084, 10086 (1988). A spokesman for the NJDEP has acknowledged the adminis-
trative problems of ECRA, but countered criticism by asserting that:
Standard operating procedures are.. . being developed that will improve the consis-
tency of decision making .... [I]t should be noted that the Department is not the
only one that has hired inexperienced staff. Due to the expansion of this field many
firms have either had to switch people from other disciplines or hire recent gradu-
ates with environmental degrees. Both the quality of our reviews and the consultant
submissions require continued efforts at improvement.
Id.
"' See Olson, supra note 41, at 10396 (backlog of applications leads to delays in certifica-
tion process).
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trigger it4" and its relationship to tax assessments." Finally, ECRA
has been criticized because cleanup quality standards have not
been set4 and, consequently, the NJDEP must review "negative
declarations and cleanup plans on a case by case basis."' "
2. Connecticut
A different approach to environmental cleanup was taken by
Connecticut in its Transfer Act.4 The statute is triggered by the
transfer of certain named establishments" or of any establishment
generating more than 100 kilograms of hazardous waste per
month or handling hazardous waste generated by another.49 The
Transfer Act does not require the submission of a proposed
cleanup plan as a precondition to transfer. 5 Prior to transfer, the
owner or operator must submit a negative declaration"' to the
transferee and, shortly thereafter, to the Commissioner of Envi-
ronmental Protection.52 If the transferor is unable to submit this
declaration, he must certify to the commissioner that he will "con-
"' See, e.g., Note, EPA Regional Administrator in New York Says Environmental Policy in State
of 'Gridlock', 17 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1190, 1191 (1986) (critique of ECRA). See also supra
note 31 and accompanying text (wide range of events may trigger ECRA).
" See, e.g., Inmar Assoc., Inc. v. Carlstadt, 112 N.J. 593, 603-09, 549 A.2d 38, 43-46
(1988) (tax assessment did not deduct costs spent by company to comply with ECRA). See
also Knee, ECRA Tax Consequences, 35 J. URB. & CoNTEMP. LAW 283, 288-89 (1989) (critical
discussion of Inmar). The reasoning in Inmar rests on a "patchwork of cases." Id. However,
the cases have no relation to the Inmar facts and, as a result, the holding could have harm-
ful effects on New Jersey's real estate market. Id.
,' See Olson, supra note 41, at 10396. An additional criticism of ECRA is that it does not
distinguish between seriously contaminated sites and sites which are "relatively innocuous."
See Note, Direct Governmental Review, Restriction and Prohibition of Private Sector Transactions
and Property Transfers, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10374, 10378 (1988) (panel
discussion).
46 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-10(a) (West Supp. 1990).
'7 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134 (1990).
" CONN. GEN. STAT. §22a-134(3) (1990). For example, "establishment" includes a dry
cleaning or furniture stripping establishment, an auto body repair shop or a painting shop.
CONN. GEN. STAT. §22a-134(3)(B) (1990).
' CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134(3)(A) (1990).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22-134a (1990).
51 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134a(b) (1990). Unlike ECRA, the Transfer Act allows a nega-
tive declaration to be submitted even if hazardous waste remains on the property. CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 22a-134(5)(2) (1990). The commissioner must determine that the substances
pose no threat to human health or safety, and that they are being managed accordingly.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134(5)(1) (1990).
5' CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134a(b) (1990). The owner or operator must submit a copy of
the declaration to the commissioner within 15 days after the transfer. Id.
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tain, remove or otherwise mitigate the effects . . . of hazardous
waste . . . . " The transferor's noncompliance5 4 renders him
strictly liable for all cleanup and removal costs,55 exposes him to a
civil penalty of up to $100,000,56 and entitles the transferee to
recover money damages,
Seeking to avoid the administrative delays of enforcement ex-
perienced by New Jersey, the Connecticut legislature drafted the
Transfer Act to allow for minimal state intervention." Such draft-
ing, however, considerably weakened the statute's impact.59 Be-
cause an actual remediation plan need not be approved by the
commissioner, 0 cleanup quality standards may vary and the trans-
fer of polluted property may still occur. Furthermore, the Act
does not permit rescission of the contract,"' arguably the strongest
incentive for compliance.
B. Notification Statutes
Notification statutes, although inspired by New Jersey's ECRA,
remove ECRA's requirement of site cleanup as a condition to
transfer. Instead, notification statutes simply require that notice of
the site's condition be given to the prospective transferee, and in
some cases to the state environmental agency. 2 It is submitted
that since these statutes closely follow property law in that they
" CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134a(c) (1990).
" CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134d (1990). Noncompliance includes knowingly giving or
causing to be given any false information. Id.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134b (1990).
" CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134d (1990).
" CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134(b) (1990).
" CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134a(b) (1990). Government intervention is minimized be-
cause the owner need only submit a copy of the negative declaration within 15 days after
transfer. Id.
" See Latest Developments, supra note 38, at 29 (impact of Connecticut statute weakened
by legislature drafting for minimal state involvement); Farer, supra note 31, at 24 (in Con-
necticut there is "no state oversight and thus no agency-instigated delays").
" CONN. GE.N. STAT. § 22a-134a(b) (1990). The commissioner's permissible involvement is
vague, despite the statutory attempt to define his authority. Id. at § 22a-1 34c. See generally
Dean, How State Hazardous Waste Statutes Influence Real Estate Transactions, 18 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 933, 933-34 (1987) (comparison of Connecticut and New Jersey statutes regarding
commissioner approval).
" See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134b (1990) (remedies for noncompliance do not include
rescission of the contract).
", See infra notes 63, 65 and accompanying text (discussion of type of notification in deed
notice and transaction-triggered notification statutes).
228
Vol. 5: 215, 1990
Hazardous Waste Cleanup
require the transferee to be given actual or constructive notice of
the hazardous condition, notification statutes may be more accept-
able to the real estate community than strict ECRA-type statutes
which more directly interfere with property transfers.
1. Deed Notice Statutes
One type of notification statute, the deed notice statute, merely
requires the disclosure of the hazardous condition to be recorded
on the deed or lease.6 Deed notice statutes simply provide the
buyer with constructive notice of the property's condition. They
do not afford the prospective buyer or government agency with
any relief if hazardous substances are found to exist."'
2. Transaction-Triggered Notification Statutes
In contrast to the deed statute, a transaction-triggered notifica-
tion statute is more comprehensive. It requires notification of the
existence of hazardous substances to be given to the purchaser or
lessee at the time of the transfer, regardless of the recordation of
any hazardous condition on the deed.6 Although stronger than
the deed notice statute, this type of statute is not as powerful as
ECRA-type statutes because actual remediation is not
mandatory. 6
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 466.360(a) (1989) (example of deed notice statute); 35 PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.405 (Purdon Supp. 1989) (same); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
70.105B (West Supp. 1989) (same); W. VA. CODE § 20-5E-20 (1986) (same).
e See, e.g., 35 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 6018.405 (Purdon Supp. 1989) (acknowledgment
of transferor's actual knowledge of hazardous waste disposal made part of deed); W. VA.
CODE § 20-5E-20 (1989) (transferor's actual knowledge prior to or during his use of haz-
ardous waste disposal is disclosed in deed or lease). See also Dean, supra note 60, at 934-35
(discusses purpose of notice requirement); Flannery & Poland, Hazardous Waste Management
Act - Closing the Circle, 84 W. VA. L. REV. 347, 391-92 (1982) (problems with West Virginia
statute include no disclosure at time of conveyance and no provision indicating conse-
quence of failure to disclose).
"See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25359.7 (Deering Supp. 1990) (Hazardous
Substance Account Act); HAW. REV. STAT. § 343D (1985) (Environmental Disclosure Law);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30, para. 901 (West Supp. 1990) (Responsible Property Transfer Act of
1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-22.5 (Burns Supp. 1990) (Responsible Property Transfer
Law); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.430 (West Supp. 1990) (Environmental Quality Act); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 115B.16 (West 1987) (Environmental Response and Liability Act); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 260.465 (Vernon 1990) (Solid Waste Law).
" See, e.g., Dean, supra note 60, at 934-35 (compared to ECRA-type statutes, notice stat-
utes provide "less drastic approach" in protecting potential purchasers); Bart, Liability of
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It is suggested that transaction-triggered notification statutes re-
veal a structure that can be broken down into five essential parts:
1) the subjected party; 2) the triggering transaction; 3) the infor-
mation required; 4) the party to whom disclosure is made; and 5)
the transferee's remedy.
Under most transaction-triggered notification statutes, owners
or transferors of commercial property are generally required to
comply with the notification requirements.6 7 Only California's re-
spective statute additionally requires lessees of nonresidential real
property to comply.68 This protects the property owner by provid-
ing him with actual knowledge of his tenant's use of hazardous
substances and allows the owner to terminate the lease upon
disclosure .69
Statutory description of the types of transactions triggering the
statute vary; typically disclosure is required upon the sale, lease or
transfer of property.7 0 Indiana's Act, for example, broadly defines
the transactions that will trigger the statute; however, it expressly
excludes conveyances of property interests such as easements, a
Innocent Landowner for Hazardous Waste - New Jersey, California, and Federal Legislation, 15
REAL EST. L.J. 260, 263-64 (1987) (comparison between New Jersey's ECRA statute and
California's notice statute indicates greater burden on seller in New Jersey).
" See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25359.7(a) (Deering Supp. 1990) (statute ap-
plies to owners of "nonresidential property"); HAw. REV. STAT. § 343D-3 (1985) (statute
applies to persons or corporations with 10% ownership of voting class securities in corpora-
tion); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30 para. 903 § 3(e) (West Supp. 1990) (statute applies to transferor
of real property); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-22.5-9,-13 (Burns Supp. 1990) (defines transferor;
transferor required to give notice); IowA CODE ANN. § 455B.430(2) (West Supp. 1990) (stat-
ute applies to owners of abandoned and uncontrolled disposal sites); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
115B.16(2) (West 1987) (notification under statute applies only to owners); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 260.465(2) (Vernon 1990) (statute applies to any seller, conveyor or transferor of aban-
doned and uncontrolled disposal site).
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25359.7(b) (Deering Supp. 1990) (statute applies to any
lessee or renter who knows or has reasonable cause to believe that hazardous substances
are located beneath real property).
69 See Farer, supra note 31, at 24 (California's statute carries real "stinger" by allowing
leasehold interest to be voidable at owner's discretion when tenant does not disclose); Latest
Developments, supra note 38, at 47 (failure of tenant to provide requisite notice to landlord
constitutes default under lease).
7' See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25359.7(a)(b) (Deering Supp. 1990) (triggered by
sale, lease or rental of real property); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, para. 903 § 3(g) (West Supp.
1990) (triggered by conveyance of property interest by deed, lease, assignment or mort-
gage); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-22.5-7 (Burns Supp. 1990) (same); IowA CODE ANN. §
455B.430(2) (West Supp. 1990) (triggered by sale, conveyance or transfer of title); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 260.465(2) (Vernon 1990) (triggered by sale, conveyance or transfer of title).
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deed of partition or an inheritance or devise." Hawaii's Environ-
mental Disclosure Act is unique because its triggering transaction
is dependent upon the sale of corporate securities.72 Minnesota's
respective statute is more difficult to trigger than most; disclosure
is mandated only by the closure of a facility."' Upon reviewing the
various transaction-triggered notification statutes, it seems clear
that broadly defining "transaction" better serves the ultimate pur-
pose of such statutes: cleaning up contaminated commercial
property.
Some statutes require detailed disclosure regarding the hazard-
ous waste condition.7' Other statutes simply require a general
description of the hazardous condition.7 5 At first blush, complete
disclosure to a prospective buyer may seem desirable; sellers, how-
ever, may be reluctant to comply for fear of revealing possible
trade secrets. 8
Disclosure provides the prospective buyer with notice. Califor-
nia's Hazardous Substance Account Act is an example of a fully
self-executing statute and requires disclosure only to the prospec-
tive buyer or lessee; the state cannot intervene to void the transac-
tion.7 7 Other self-executing statutes require notification to be
71 IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-22.5-7(b)(1)-(14) (Burns Supp. 1990).
" HAW. REV. STAT. § 343D-3 (1985) (statute triggered when owner of 10% or more of
voting class securities purchases 5% of additional securities or assets in twelve month
period).
78 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.16(1), (2) (West 1987).
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 343D-3 (1985) (disclosure includes: complete financial dis-
closure, history of prior environmental law compliance, future environmental actions re-
quired in next five years); ILuL REV. STAT. ch. 30, para. 905 (West Supp. 1990) (disclosure on
six page document includes: description of operations that generated, manufactured,
processed, transported, stored or handled hazardous waste; permit use; site plans; history
of hazardous releases; history of prior ownership); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-22.5-15 (Burns
Supp. 1990) (same); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.430(1) (West Supp. 1990) (disclosure includes
only that disposal site on state's registry); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 11 5B. 16(2)(a)-(c) (West 1987)
(disclosure affidavit includes: statement asserting that land was used to dispose of hazardous
waste or is contaminated by release of hazardous substance; identification, quantity, loca-
tion, condition and circumstance of disposal; and property use restrictions); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 260.465(2) (Vernon 1990) (disclosure includes: site on state registry; applicable use re-
strictions; all registry information; buyer's assumption of cleanup liability).
"7 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25359.7(a) (Deering Supp. 1990) (written notice
describing the hazardous condition to buyer is adequate).
"' Cf. Note, New Jersey's Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act: An Innovative Approach
To Environmental Regulation, 90 DIcK. L. Rzv. 159, 185-85 (1985) (individuals in competitive
industries regard disclosure requirements of ECRA as possibly jeopardizing trade secrets).
" See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25359.7(a), (b) (Deering Supp. 1990) (disclosure
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given to the appropriate government agency, either before or af-
ter the conveyance; 78 however, some states additionally require
disclosure to government agencies. Like New Jersey's ECRA,
these statutes require disclosure to, and approval from, a govern-
ment agency before the transaction can be consummated.7
Statutes requiring government notification enable the respec-
tive government agency to more efficiently identify properties
that are most in need of remediation. Although an agency under a
government notification statute is not empowered to prevent a
sale of polluted land, it can require the submission of a proposed
cleanup plan which it has the power to enforce. The downside to
this incentive for remediation is the potential adverse effect ad-
ministrative involvement may have on commercial real estate
transactions. At a minimum, transfers may take longer; at most,
they may be discouraged.
Once disclosure of the existence of a regulated hazardous sub-
stance has been made, the various transaction-triggered notifica-
tion statutes provide an assortment of remedies. For example, Illi-
nois' and Indiana's Responsible Property Transfer Acts each
provide a purchaser with the power to void the transaction." Cali-
fornia's Hazardous Substance Account Act goes one step further
by providing a purchaser with the power to void the sale and to
collect damages.81 Other statutes, such as Iowa's Environmental
Quality Act and Missouri's Solid Waste Law provide the state en-
made from seller to buyer, or from lessee to owner or lessor).
To See, e.g., ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 30, para. 904, para. 906 (West Supp. 1990) (disclosure
document given to transferee, if any, and to lender, if any, 30 days prior to transfer; dis-
closure document must also be given to office of recorder in county in which property is
located and Illinois EPA within 30 days of transfer); INn. CODE ANN. § 13-7-22.5-10(a), -
16(a) (Burns Supp. 1990) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.16(2) (West 1987) (disclosure
made, prior to sale, to county recorder in county in which property located, in order to
make it available in ordinary title search).
T See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 343D-3(1) (1985) (disclosure made to state agency, who
must review disclosure statements and make determination of adequacy); IowA CODE ANN. §
455B,430(2) (West Supp. 1990) (disclosure made prior to sale to director of state environ-
mental agency, who must in turn approve owner's request for transfer).
" ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, para. 904, 907 (West Supp. 1990) (the parties can void transfer
within 10 days, plus civil penalty of $1000 per day may be imposed); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-
22.5-12, -21 (Burns Supp. 1990) (party may void and bring civil action to recover conse-
quential damages).
" CAL. HEALTn & SAFETY CODE § 25359.7(a) (Deering Supp. 1990) (actual damages, civil
penalty, and other remedies provided by law).
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vironmental agency with a remedy, but afford none to the pur-
chaser. 82 Hawaii's Environmental Disclosure Law provides reme-
dies to any person involved in the sale, including shareholders of a
company that is the target of a takeover.88 Finally, Minnesota's
statute provides, inter alia, a remedy to the state agency by giving
it the power to enforce the statutorily mandated disclosure." It is
submitted that while the remedy provision of notification statutes
merely governs "adequate" compliance, harsh penalties, such as
rescission of the contract, create a greater incentive for compli-
ance and set transaction triggered notification apart from deed
notice statutes.
III. NEW YORK
A. Proposals
Since 1986, legislation similar to ECRA has been repeatedly
proposed in the New York State Legislature; however, each pro-
posal has died in committee.' The 1989 proposal88 required the
" IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.430(4) (West Supp. 1990) (injunctive relief available to direc-
tor, plus civil penalty of $1000 per day per violation may be imposed); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
260.465(4) (Vernon 1990) (same).
" HAW. REv. STAT. § 343D-10 (1985) (person, shareholder, court, attorney general can
each enjoin purchase; in addition civil penalties up to $100,000 may be imposed).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.16(2)(c), (4)(a), (4)(c) (West 1987) (does not effect or prevent
transfer of ownership; county attorney or attorney general may bring action to impose or
recover civil penalty up to $100,000).
5 See Attorney General's Program Bill (Property Owners' Protection Act) (1990); State
of New York Legislative Digest, 212th Annual Legislative Session at A621 (1989); State of
New York Legislative Digest, 211th Regular Session at A755 (1988); State of New York
Legislative Digest, 210th Regular Session at A213-14 (1987); State of New York Legisla-
tive Digest, 209th Regular Session at A635-36 (1986).
Governor Cuomo initiated environmental cleanup legislation in his 1986 state of the
State address. See N.Y. Gov. Ann. Mess. (1986), reprinted in [1986] N.Y. Legis. Ann. 64.
(Governor proposed ECRA-type legislation). See also New York Governor Cuomo to Propose
Legislation to Require Cleanups When Property Is Sold, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1575, 1575
(1987) (reporting Governor Cuomo's support for ECRA-type bill).
A. 8041, 212th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989). This was a proposed amendment to Article 27
of the Environmental Conservation Law. Id. at 1. The accompanying statement in support
of the amendment asserted that:
A fundamental principle of the proposed Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act
("ECRA") is that those persons with knowledge of pollution must clean it up prior to
any transfer of the property. ECRA fosters a private route to environmental quality
and places the cleanup responsibility where it belongs. This bill would require, as a
pre-condition of any transfer by owners of non-residential real property, either a
formal certification that such property has not been the subject of any unauthorized
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owner, 87 upon the transfer 8 of non-residential real property 9 to
furnish either a certificate of public safety or a certificate of com-
pliance to the transferee.9" As defined by the proposals, a certifi-
cate of public safety would have warranted that the property had
never been or was no longer subject to the release of any hazard-
ous substance.9" Likewise, a certificate of compliance would have
contained the transferor's guarantee to remedy the effect of any
release of hazardous substances or petroleum or that a compliance plan has been
formulated. The costs of any necessary cleanup plans would be borne by the owner
of the property ... State agencies have supervised and approved dozens of cleanups
which could have been avoided if the provisions contained in this bill were current
law. Failure to contain environmental contamination may hasten its spread, requir-
ing expenditure of public funds at some future date and posing a risk to human
health and natural resources. ECRA is an important, proven and necessary piece of
legislation which serves to further the environmental quality and economic viability
of this State and to shift future public liability for environmental damage to private
wrongdoers. Because of the immediate economic threat posed to the would-be pol-
luter, this bill should help deter the environmentally dangerous release of hazardous
substances.
Attorney General's Legislative Program, Revised Memorandum in Support of A.8041, at 2
(1989-90). See generally Scagnelli & Gold, New York's Movement Toward an Environmental
Cleanup Responsibility Act: Learning From the New Jersey Experience, N.Y. ST. B.J. (Jan. 1990)
45, 48-49 (comparison and critique of two proposed ECRA bills).
87 See A. 8041, 212th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989). Proposed § 27-1605(7). Owner is defined
as any person who has legal title to the property. Id. at § 27-1605(7) (proposal). "Person"
includes "any individual, public or private corporation, political subdivision, government
agency, municipality, copartnership, association, firm, trust or estate." Id. at § 27-1605(8)
(proposal).
" Id. at § 27-1605(11) (proposal). "Transfer" is defined as "any transaction by which
nonresidential real property undergoes a change of ownership . I..." d  This is a substan-
tial revision of the 1988 proposal which defined transfer as "every transaction by which
any estate or interest in nonresidential real property is created, transferred, mortgaged or
assigned, or by which the title to any real property may be affected .... See A. 11618,
211th Leg., Reg. Sess., at § 27-1605 (1988) (proposal).
89 A. 8041, 212th Leg., Reg. Sess., at § 27-1605(6) (1989) (proposal). "Nonresidential
real property" is defined as "any real property which, at the time of transfer, is not im-
proved solely by one or more dwelling units and outbuildings consistent with residential
use." Id. The previous year's proposal did not define this term; therefore, multi-unit apart-
ment, cooperative and condominium units were potentially subject to the requirements of
the bill. Cf A. 11618. 211th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1988).
" See A. 8041, 212th Leg., Reg. Sess., at § 27-1607(1) (1989) (proposal).
91 A. 8041. 212th Leg., Reg. Sess., at § 27-1605(2) (1989) (proposal). A "certificate of
public safety" is a sworn declaration stating either that there has been no release nor any
threat of release of hazardous substances or petroleum on or at the property or that, if
there has been contamination, that all remediation obligations required in the certificate of
compliance have been met. Id. This certificate is similar to the negative declaration re-
quired under New Jersey's ECRA. Cf N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-8(g) (West Supp. 1990) (neg-
ative declaration required).
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release or threat of release of any hazardous substance. 92 Pro-
posed state involvement in the certification process was to be min-
imal."3 The proposed penalty for noncompliance was to be a
$25,000 fine. 9" This proposal passed the Assembly but never
progressed further than the Senate Rules Committee."
The most recent proposal, submitted in 1990 and entitled the
Property Owners' Protection Act 6 (POPA), would have required
the transferor 7 of commercial real property" to execute a decla-
ration of due diligence prior to transfer."' This declaration would
have warranted that the transferor investigate with due diligence
the condition of the property, and, if necessary, undertake the
remediation of any release of hazardous substances that had been
9" A. 8041, 212th Leg., Reg. Sess., at § 27-1605(3) (1989). A "certificate of compliance"
essentially states that the owner will be responsible for remediation of the effects of con-
tamination "in, on, at or migrating from the property" to be transferred. Id. (proposal).
'a Compare A. 8041, 212th Leg., Reg. Sess., at § 27-1607 (1989) (proposal) (obligations
upon transferor only) with proposed § 27-1611 (duties of commissioner imply state involve-
ment). Unlike New Jersey's ECRA, this bill places primary responsibility on the owner. See
supra note 35 and accompanying text (NJDEP must certify that the premises have been
detoxified).
The owner is required to conduct "an inquiry and investigation into the current and
previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary
standards." A. 8041, 212th Leg., Reg. Sess., at § 27-1607(2) (1989) (proposal). Although
the commissioner is empowered to enter upon and inspect the property in question, this is
not a precondition to certification. See id. at § 27-1611(2) (proposal).
A. 8041, 212th Leg., Reg. Sess., at § 71-2729 (1989) (proposal). This is a significant
departure from the 1988 proposal which imposed criminal sanctions as a penalty. See A.
11618, 211 th Leg., Reg. Sess., at § 71-2705(2) (1988) (proposal). Under the 1989 proposal,
rescission of the contract was not an option. See A. 8041, 212th Leg., Reg. Sess. (buyer can
not rescind sale). But see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-13(b) (West Supp. 1990) (buyer can
void sale).
" See A8041 State of New York Legislative Digest, 212th Annual Legislative Session at
A621 (1989) (progressed only to Senate Committee).
Attorney General's Program Bill (Property Owners' Protection Act) (1990). See gener-
ally Where's POPA?, supra note 7, at 36-37 (POPA's disclosure requirements can effectively
protect public health).
" Id. at § 27-1603(10) (proposal). It is defined as "the transfer or transfers of any inter-
est in commercial real property by any method, including ... sale, .exchange, assignment,
surrender, option, trust, indenture, conveyance upon liquidation or by a receiver or acqui-
sition of a controlling interest in commercial real property." Id. The 1990 proposal's defi-
nition of "transfer" is more structured than it has been in past proposals. See, e.g., supra
note 88 and accompanying text (discussion of 1989 proposal's definition of "transfer").
" Attorney General's Program Bill (POPA) (1990) § 27-1603(2) (proposal). "Commer-
cial real property" is defined as "any real property which, at the time of transfer, is not
improved solely by any dwelling units and outbuildings consistent with residential use." Id.
Id. at §27-1605 (proposal).
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or had threatened to be discharged. 100 Like Connecticut's Trans-
fer Act, POPA did not permit a buyer to rescind the contract.
Thus, a strong incentive for compliance was left out. 01 Like its
predecessor, POPA never progressed further than the Assembly
Rules Committee.
1 0 2
B. The Ideal Statute
This Note proposes an "ideal" statute for New York that is
tempered by the reality of past legislative failures. Although the
New York Legislature is reluctant to affirmatively enact a transac-
tion-triggered cleanup statute, the annual proposals evidence their
recognition of the need for such a statute to fill the gaps left by
CERCLA, namely, by imposing cleanup liability on responsible
parties.
To be most effective, owners, operators or transferors, as well
as lessees of nonresidential real property should be subject to the
provisions of the statutes.1 03 This requirement would broaden the
scope of POPA by incorporating California's inclusion of lessees
in the definition of "subjected parties."
To properly address the need to target responsible parties, trig-
gering events should be drafted broadly to include any transfer of
non-residential property. Thus, "transfers" should be defined as
any sale, lease, or closure of non-residential property, with limited
exceptions for "passive" transfers, such as inheritances, tax deeds,
deeds of partitions, easements and transfers by operation of law
100 Id. at §27-1603(4) (proposal). The proposal permits the transferor and the transferee
to expressly agree to allocate responsibility for remediation. Id. at §27-1603(4)(b)(ii)
(proposal).
101 Telephone interview with John Privitera, Assistant Attorney General, Environmental
Protection Bureau, New York State Attorney General's Office (March 22, 1990). The lat-
est version of the New York Proposal does not include a provision for rescission for two
reasons. Id. First, a rescission clause encourages buyer's reliance on the seller's disclosure
and cuts back on the buyer's duty of diligence. Id. Second, if the government discovers
hazardous substances on the site, and the buyer is allowed to rescind the sale, the govern-
ment is forced to find the original seller to cleanup the site. Id. Typically, the original seller
is not available, thereby leaving the cleanup and costs to the government. Id. Cf. supra
notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussion of weakness of Connecticut's Transfer Act).
102 Telephone interview with New York State Assembly Chambers (September 18,
1990).
10 See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussion of subjected parties to other
state statutes).
236
Vol. 5: 215, 1990
Hazardous Waste Cleanup
upon the death of a joint tenant. Clearly delineating the scope of
a "transfer" will avoid the confusion caused by ECRA's vague ter-
minology' 04 and would better serve the purpose of alerting par-
ticipants in non-residential real estate transactions to potential
remediation responsibility.
The ideal statute should require disclosure of detailed informa-
tion regarding operations that generate, manufacture, process,
transport, store or handle hazardous substances.105 In addition, all
releases of hazardous substances by current and past owners
should be disclosed. Full disclosure puts the parties at arm's
length, making the transaction as fair as possible.
The statute should require disclosure to both the transferee and
the New York Department of Environmental Conservation
(DEC).106 To better protect the interests of the innocent trans-
feree, it is imperative that he receive actual notice of the trans-
feror's disclosure rather than the mere constructive notice pre-
sumed under deed notice statutes. 10 7 Again, this is to assure that
liability is placed on the responsible party. Disclosure to the DEC
should be made within a reasonable time before the transfer of
the property. Timely disclosure will better allow the agency to
properly gauge the necessary response and to meet the need for
the imposition of cleanup liability. In this respect, past New York
proposals were weak because notification to the DEC was not
mandated until after the transaction was consummated. 08
Finally, New York's transaction-triggered cleanup statute
should provide transferors with sufficient incentive to comply; al-
lowing the transferee to void the sale is such an incentive. This
would effectively place liability on the responsible party once the
204 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (critical discussion of ECRA's vague
terminology).
'05 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (discussion of description requirements
in various state transfer notification statutes).
206 Cf supra notes 91, 92, 100 and accompanying text (discussion of New York's prior
proposals required different types of certification requirements).
107 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussion of construction notice given
by deed notice statutes).
108 See, e.g., Attorney General Program Bill (1990) (POPA) § 336-a (declarations of due
diligence filed with county clerk within 72 hours of transfer); State of New York Legisla-
tive Digest, 212th Annual Legislative Session at A621 (1989) (certificate of compliance
filed with Department within 72 hours of transfer).
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undisclosed contamination has been discovered. No sale would be
binding absent remediation by the owner of the property. To fur-
ther strengthen the statute, the DEC should be afforded a rem-
edy, such as the power to enforce an approved cleanup plan. Any
agency induced delays would be countered by the owner's desire
to consummate the sale.
CONCLUSION
Transaction-triggered cleanup statutes are an aggressive at-
tempt by the states to address and resolve a stubborn environmen-
tal problem - effectively placing remediation liability on the pol-
luting party. Notification statutes alert interested parties to the
possible existence of hazardous conditions, yet because they con-
tain no mandate of cleanup, they generally fall short of the mark.
Conditional cleanup statutes, on the other hand, fill a void left by
notification statutes by requiring remediation measures to be
taken. Besides failing to adequately allocate cleanup responsibility,
these statutes have failed to properly balance the necessary gov-
ernment involvement. As a result, statutes are either too weak, as
in Connecticut, or overly restrictive, as in New Jersey. The New
York State Legislature has had the opportunity to evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of other cleanup statutes. Given this
beneficial insight, it seems clear that New York could most effec-
tively achieve the goal of placing cleanup responsibility on the pol-
luting party by passing a transaction-triggered notification statute.
If enacted, such a statute would best serve the purposes of warn-
ing potential transferees of the existence of hazardous substances
and would force transferors to clean their sites, thus achieving the
goal of properly placing cleanup liability where it belongs: with
the polluter.
Nancy G. Feeney & Jorin G. Rubin
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